Prospect Theory, Conventional Deterrence & Terrorist Game Models: The Difficult Task of Qualitatively Analyzing Terrorism, Negotiation & Threat in the Palestinian & Israeli Conflict
... $100 should mean the same to them no matter what the circumstances are. He shows this to be false. Suppose you offer someone the choice between losing $200 and losing only $100 if they’ll walk a certain difference. Keep increasing the distance until you find the point where they treat the two outcomes equally. Loss aversion suggests that if you turn this around so people either gain $100 for sure or gain $200 if they will walk a distance, the ‘gain’ choices balance at a distance much shorter than they were willing to walk to avoid loss. (Kimminau: 18) The third axiom is called framing. Framing is the simplest idea in prospect theory, as it shows that people take outside factors into account when making decisions. These outside factors can have a direct connection with the decision being made or none at all. In essence, it only matters whether the decision maker thinks that these outside influence affect the matter at hand. Kimminau illustrates this by describing how test subjects made different decisions based only on how the problem was worded, even though nothing within the problem itself had been affected at all. This means that a decision can be altered beforehand by changing the context in which that decision is made. The fourth axiom concerns decision weighting. Here, people weight probabilities differently depending on their size rather than on their absolute effects. Kimminau shows that people will treat a decrease in odds from “20% to 15% differently than a decrease from 55% to 50%- the 5% effect is the same, but generally the 20% to 15 % decrease is considered more drastic.” (Kimminau: 20) Hence, the research shows that people tend to overweight small probabilities, underweight moderate probabilities and overweight probabilities close to certainty. This is important to understand, as decision makers will tend to act under those conditions. Now that the basic ideas of prospect theory have been sufficiently explained, we can look to see how it applies to the current Palestinian situation. First, we establish the Palestinian’s reference point, which was a Zionist-free Palestine. From there, we can see how the Palestinians are operating within the domain of losses, as none of the popular plans circulating the region include expelling Israelis from Israel. This means that the Palestinians will be more risk-taking in their actions, which in turn explains the attacks by terrorist groups such as Hamas, al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, the various more radical PLO splinter groups and Islamic Jihad. These groups continually deny accepting any sort of mediation. Whenever Israel stipulates that violence needs to be stopped before any further negotiations take place, one of these terrorist groups shows risk preference by striking against Israeli targets, each time knowing that Israel would follow its collective punishment policies. The framing of the decision is also important here. The terrorist actors know that the United States has directly or indirectly supported Israel in an increasing manner in the past decades. With $3 billion in aid annually, the United States indirectly condones Israeli retaliatory strikes against Palestinian civilian targets by not refusing to withhold funding in exchange for easing strikes. America’s war against terror has not allowed any dissention on matters such as defense against terrorism. The US isn’t able to criticize Israel’s actions when they’re made in self-defense, especially not after the ongoing campaign in Afghanistan. Each time that the US makes demands on Palestinians to stop the violence, it is known that the US has supported Israel throughout its controversial history and has refused to step and fight for Palestinian civil rights. After the US jumped to save the oil rich regime in Kuwait after standing by during the Israeli-Lebanese conflict of 1982, American status and prestige in the region was permanently damaged. Though the US has occasionally chastised Israel for its methods, no serious legislation has ever been proposed to condemn the embattled state. Recently, Congress passed a resolution stating their blind support of Israel in its campaign against terror, despite President Bush’s statements pushing for moderation. This sort of bipolar relationship with Israel has been longstanding and frustrating for Palestinian militants. So if a terrorist decision maker knows that Israel will respond in kind to each attack, why has Israel failed to establish a credible deterrence threat against terrorism while it has managed to create a credible deterrence against state-to-state violence? To understand this, it is first important to understand the basics of conventional deterrence theory and Israel’s failed Iron Wall strategy. Conventional Deterrence & Israel’s Failed Iron Wall Strategy Israel’s Iron Wall strategy was the centerpiece of Israeli defense policy until the recent shift in Israeli politics back to the right after a short time as a moderate and somewhat more accomadationist regime. This Iron Wall is one of resolve, one that can repel Arab attackers and critics of the Zionist homeland and philosophies while forcing Israel’s neighbors and enemies alike into recognizing Israel’s power, resolve and ultimately, its legitimacy. Lustick divides the Iron Wall strategy into a five-stage plan and shows how Israel failed to maintain this policy after sustaining it successfully for almost fifty years. (Lustick, Ian, To Build and to Be Built By: Israel and the Hidden Logic of the Iron Wall) The first stage is the construction of the Iron Wall. The second is the defense of this wall against those attempting to breach it. The third is observing opponents’ political atmosphere “shift from extremism towards moderate willing to compromise.” (Lustick: 4) The fourth stage is Israel shifting it’s own politics from those of aggression to those of negotiation. The final stage is an agreement between the two parties, negotiated as equals. Lustick shows how the Iron Wall was originally conceived in early Zionist dialogues by the revisionist Zionist leader Vladimir Jabotinsky. Jabotinsky used his argument to show how Israel would be allowed to develop as a country in Palestine, which he believed would always be inhabited by two peoples. By maintaining the Iron Wall, Israel would force the Arabs to accept the Zionist state through repeated, crushing military defeats. Therefore, Israeli defense strategists placed emphasis on “aggressiveness, pre-emption, qualitative superiority, universal service and rapid mobilization capability. (Lustick: 4) It was this emphasis that caused the failure in moving from the third to the fourth stage. This failure shows the flaws in the Iron Wall strategy. Though it worked in defending Israel from outside attack, the theory behind the strategy assumed that Israelis would be willing and able to live side by side with Palestinian Arabs. Unsurprisingly, the military leadership of the 50’s, 60’s, 70’s and 80’s moved on from being generals to becoming Foreign Ministers, Housing Secretaries and Prime Ministers. This political leadership has largely been unwilling to give any concessions to the Palestinians, with the exception of Yitzhak Rabin, Ehud Barak and Shimon Peres. Rabin was assassinated while Barak and Peres were both ousted from their positions. What would seem obvious to political scientists has not seemed to occur to the Israeli political establishment. A nation is different from a state, in that a state has the necessary political institutions with which to negotiate treaties, create armies and control its population. The Palestinians, though they do have a semi-autonomous authority with minimal political power, do not have the political establishments needed to negotiate the permanent peace process. Therefore, whenever Sharon demands peace in order for negotiations to continue and Palestinian extremists respond with terror attacks, the Israelis are exacting a price from both the Palestinian and Israeli citizenry by refusing to cooperate with the Palestinian representatives. The Iron Wall strategy worked against belligerent states; it cannot work against a nation without any real political or military power. Though Israel attempted to move into the fourth stage, as illustrated by Rabin’s negotiations and Barak’s more recent attempt, it did not succeed in staying a moderate, willing-to-negotiate political body. Sharon, known by Palestinians as a staunch, hard line military leader first and barely at all as a peacemaker, is politically challenged by an even more hard line candidate, Benjamin Netanyahu. The current intifada shows no signs of relenting in the immediate future. Therefore, if Israel were to continue with its Iron Wall strategy, it would be forced to revert back to the second stage, the defense of the Iron Wall, if not all the way back to the first. By retreating back to the second stage, Israel will have shown the inadequacy of the Iron Wall strategy in terms of Palestinian-Israeli relations. It will also force Israel to try and create a significant and capable deterrent threat to Palestinian terrorism, something that despite all of its success in deterring other states from attacking Israel, it has not been able to do with terrorists. Using lessons drawn from conventional deterrence theory, one can see how and why Israel has been unable to deter suicide attacks through collective punishment. Ed Rhodes discusses the general failures of conventional deterrence in his Review of Empirical Studies of Conventional Deterrence (Rhodes, Ed. Review of Empirical Studies of Conventional Deterrence, Rutgers, 1999). He points out three major conclusions from this study. First, some potential aggressors simply cannot be deterred. Second, it is important to deny a potential aggressor the ability to win a quick war. Third, he shows that threats to an aggressor’s society do not matter. The aggressor will only feel respond when his military forces are endangered and or his politico-military objectives have been denied. The Palestinian extremist groups have largely been undeterred from attacking despite the ferocity of the Israeli retaliatory strikes. Israel has succeeded in denying the Palestinians the ability to win a quick war, as the terrorist conflict has been raging for nearly half of a century. It has not, however, done well in threatening the terrorist military forces or in denying them their politico-military objectives. By bulldozing suspected terrorist havens or homes of the terrorists themselves, the Israelis are threatening the Palestinian society at large. Collective punishment has proven its inefficacy time and time again in the region. The Palestinians realize that there are two dynamic effects to Israel dishing out excessive collective punishment for suicide attacks. First, the number of Palestinian terror attacks is directly related to the Israeli retaliations. If Israel is constantly harassing and attacking defenseless Palestinian cities, there will be that many more frustrated and impoverished Palestinian men looking to take revenge on Israel. If Israel is constantly increasing pressure on Palestinians to cease the terrorist attacks, it only increases the terrorist ranks. Palestinian terrorist groups know this and have used it to their advantage for decades. The official Hizbollah website points out that an aggressive and hostile Israel only creates more enemies of that state in the refugee camps, while a conciliatory and accommodating Israel only succeeds in creating political dissention within the Knesset. The difficulties are obvious. Secondly, Rhodes also shows that world opinion of a deterring state may be damaged by over-retaliating. “The international political costs of imposing draconian punishment on an aggressor state, its government or its society may be substantial, and a highly motivated challenger may take this into account in estimating the costs of a losing war.” (Rhodes: 4) This is illustrated today through EU and UN condemnation of Israeli defense tactics, such as bulldozing homes and imposing curfews on entire regions for the actions of a single suicide bomber. As long as the world is not condemning Palestinians for their tactics, they are, in a sense, working. Though one would be hard pressed to find a single government that publicly endorses suicide bomber tactics, it is not so difficult to find a sympathetic columnist who empathizes with the Palestinian plight and refuses to criticize the Palestinian campaign for what they see as brave actions made in the name of freedom. Rhodes also argues “even the virtual certainty of losing a conventional war may be more attractive than failing to act.” (Rhodes: 4) This is true of the Palestinians. Simply accepting Israel’s dominance is intolerable in the eyes of many. Arafat, while a strong revolutionary leader, has shown his inadequacy as a peacetime interior minister. For him to have any popular support, he is forced to be a risk-taker and tacitly support the more extreme tactics of the Palestinian terror groups. This may be why he refuses to condemn the arms shipments from Iran that Israel recently intercepted. So why does Arafat continue to act against Israel? Is he an eternal terrorist or a future political leader? To explore this further, it would be helpful to use Bruce Bueno de Mesquita’s work on terrorist game theory. Terrorist Game Theory & Arafat’s Leadership Role In order to define a terrorist game, one must first define the word terrorist. As de Mesquita points out, “one person’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter.” (de Mesquita: 185) de Mesquita points...