Law and its meaning
...“responsible” is a casual concept. I will show that the doctrine of “responsibility” depends upon a theory of action embodying a view of will as man’s purposeful power to move himself. A Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford, Hart’s interest in the question of “responsibility” arises from his concern with matters of law. He believes that the law books have incorporated erroneous philosophical theories of action which legal practice and ordinary language show to be mistaken. In particular, sentences about actions, in the form, e.g, “He did it,” do not describe events going on in the mind of the doers (as well as bodily movements), but rather ascribe responsibility to them. The non-reference to mental acts of action propositions emerged from an examination of legal practice and ordinary language about contracts in civil law, and the mens rea in criminal law. The “ascribing” function of action concepts can be seen by comparison with other non-descriptive functions of language, as recognition of rights and judicial decisions. In the matter of contracts, there are, Hart points out, no nece...