Israeli settlers
...ulture, and defense, or returned to the Palestinians as the basis for a permanent peace solution? UN Resolution 242 calls for the exchange of land conquered by Israel as the basis for peace negotiations between the two parties, but Israeli positions argue that certain settled areas of the West Bank and Gaza are crucial for Israeli interests and have been earned through Israeli military superiority in 1967. B. Economic Analysis Large and small Jewish settlements exist throughout the West Bank and Gaza. Bypass roads link the settlements to Israel proper, and their increasingly sound infrastructure increases the barriers to eventual dismantling. Some settlers are fervently nationalistic in their claims to land they believe existed in biblical Judea and Samaria, while other settlers live in the disputed territories for its open space, affordability, and sense of community. The government provides for both of these settlers in the form of protection and subsidization. In fact, the average Israeli per capita govt. investment in settlements is three times that within the Green Line. Some of the perks include: $20 thousand: Loans given to settlers building new homes in priority areas 69%: Land-value discount taken off residential lease fees 7%: Average income-tax cut provided at most settlements 90%: Amount nursery-school tuition slashed in many areas Ironically, much of this money comes from US aid. Since 1948, the United States has given over 84.8 billion dollars to Israel , much of which has gone to its “security” concerns. Despite US proclamations that settlements are illegal and are a “hindrance to peace” no US president or Congress has stopped the aid. This maybe because the Israelis have the second most powerful lobby (AIPAC) which has donated $41.3 million to candidates since 1989. C. Social Analysis Until 1967 religious Zionists in Israel were marginalized both by the secular majority, and by the more visibly religious groups that seemed to offer a more authentic, uncompromising brand of religion. The Six-Day War of June 1967 resulted in the capture of East Jerusalem and other territories of the Biblical Land of Israel. The long-range fate of these territories, and their Arab inhabitants, became a major controversy of Israeli policy makers. From a purely secular perspective, the choice was between the military security that was offered by the expanded borders and the relative demographic stability that would be achieved by excluding their large Arab population from the domain of a Jewish state. A religious claim provided strong justification for those who wished to hold on to the occupied territories: If the State of Israel was viewed as the unfolding of a Messianic scenario, then the miraculous victory of the Six-Day War was an essential stage in that process. The territories belong to the Jewish people (i.e., the State of Israel) by Divine decree and they may not be handed over to foreign hands. The issue of territories, viewed in such a context, became the defining feature for broad segments of religious Zionism in the post-1967 era. Depending on the political and security climate of Israel, the settlements have faced varying degrees of societal acceptance. Israel has various laws that curtail the influence of the Orthodox Jews in politics, but throughout the years, there has been a convergence of interests. (Shimoni, 1995; p. 269) D. Identity According to Orthodox interpretations, Jewish identity is passed on via the mother. If the mother is Jewish, the child is automatically Jewish. This is true regardless of who the father is, and whether he is Jewish or not, and regardless of whether the Jewish mother practiced another religion. Jewish identity passed on through the mother had been accepted by Jews for some 3,000 years, and according to the Orthodox Rabbis, was decided by God, as recorded in the Five Books of Moses in Deut. 7:3-4. In this manner, to be a “Jew” was to be part of the “a nation chosen by God”. (Sprinzak, 1991; p.217) In 1948, Israel was established as a State for the Jews of the Diaspora. Israel's Law of Return automatically granted Israeli citizenship to anyone anywhere in the world who is a Jew. This law magnified the need to distinguish between Jews and non-Jews, and led to further conflict between orthodox and liberal Jews over which conversions were kosher and should be acceptable in Israel. To the Jews of the world, but especially Israelis, the question of Jewish identity is crucial. Fundamentalist Zionists further assert that all of “historical” Israel is holy, and based on Divine Ordinance, the Jews have an inalienable part to all of it” (Sprinzak, 1991; p.223). Jews certainly had a shared history of economic and social displacement, but the collective remembrance of historic Israel cannot be discounted (Shimoni, 1995; p.8). A distinguishing mark of the-Zionist ideology is the proposition that the Jews are, actually, or potentially, a nation. (Shimoni, 1995; p.4) The issue becomes even more contentious because some Orthodox Jews consider the secular Zionists to be heretics. In fact, the influx of Russian Jews, who are largely secular, has divided many Israelis. Zionist sought a homeland for the Jews, while the messianics “promised the return of Zion and the ingathering of the exiles” (Ravitzky, 1993; p.37). In other words, the two were interlinked. Both ideologies, however, required the displacement of an indigenous population. II. The Movement During war or peace, the settler movement persisted. In fact, after the Oslo peace process, the number of Israeli settlers in the Occupied Territories doubled (today, there are currently an estimated 214 settlements inhabited by 398,000 Israelis). What hasn't slowed down is the rate of Israeli settlement building. On the contrary, according to the authoritative Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories (RISOT), it has almost doubled over the past few years. The Report adds that “1,924 settlement units have been started” since the start of the 'pro-peace' regime of Ehud Barak in July 1999 - and there is in addition the continuing program of road-building and the expropriation of property for that purpose, as well as the degradation of Palestinian agricultural land both by the Army and the settlers. The Gaza-based Palestinian Center for Human Rights has documented the 'sweepings' of olive groves and vegetable farms by the IDF near the Rafah border, for example, and on either side of the Gush Katif settlement block. Gush Katif is an area of Gaza - about 40 per cent - occupied by a few thousand settlers, who can water their lawns and fill their swimming pools, while the one million Palestinian inhabitants of the Strip (800,000 of them refugees from former Palestine) live in a dry, water-free zone. Critics have long charged that settlements, though small and scattered, criss-cross the West Bank and Gaza so that no coherent state could emerge there. Furthermore, while the settlements have long been acknowledged as a violation of international law, they cannot have been sustained without massive government and foreign assistance. Israeli politicians, who view the settlements as a strategic necessity, have supported the expansion. As a politician noted, “you settlers of Judea and Samaria… you are the ones who maintain the households and drive on the roads and by doing so express the continued life and hold on these difficult areas, and by doing so are real Jewish heroes.” (Ravitzky, 1993; p.81) Such open support for the settlements has been more common since of the founding architects of the movement, Ariel Sharon, became the Prime Minister of Israel. As he has publicly: “I don't see myself evacuating any settlement, not in the short term, in the context of interim agreements, and not in the long term, in the context of a permanent agreement." Even today, they continue to fight to include as much of the West Bank and Gaza Strip as possible for the state of Israel. That leads them to the incredible position of opposing a security fence on the "green line", the June 4, 1967 border. The existence of such a fence, the radicals believe, would concede most of the West Bank and Gaza to the Palestinians. In fact, the recent Palestinian intifada has been skillfully used for the settlers’ advantage. The settlements have become more than just a means of grabbing territory. They are also a means of provoking Palestinians to violence, and gaining international support. For example, in Hebron, 500 settlers “mingle” with 150,000 Palestinians. Since the violence began, 35 Jewish settlers have been killed in drive-by shootings and roadside ambushes. To protect such settlers from reprisals the government has maintained a massive military presence in the Palestinian lands. (Sprinzak, 1991; p.135) The settlers have used a finely polished public relations campaign to distort their true intentions. For example, in a metropolitan newspaper, Rabbi Hillel Goldberg asserted, “Israeli settlements do not hinder Palestinian agricultural or political life. Sometimes, just the opposite, as in Efrat. This settlement, part of Gush Etzion, provides medical services for two Arab villages.” According to such Zionists, the term settlements are a politically loaded term, which will actually bring about a “pluralistic Palestinian society”. If a Palestinian state emerges, Israeli settlements will confirm, not deny, democratic norms. As Goldberg asserts, “settlements will guarantee that Palestine would not be racist, restricted to a single ethnic group. Settlements make this political statement: Any state ought to be pluralistic, with a majority and minorities. Jewish settlers would be the minority in a Palestinian state. To urge the removal of the settlers is to encourage a state that excludes Jews.” In a PBS documentary , the settlers were characterized as uncompromising messianic idealists. The settlers believe in a strong Jewish state, often times asserting their desire for the destruction of the current secular institutions. They demand the right to settle historic Judea and Samara (i.e. the Gaza Strip and West Bank) with full government support, assistance, and protection. Furthermore, any Israeli or non-Israeli who does not accept their presence on the land “as a Jew” is anti-Semitic. As one settler explained, “We don’t want hurt anyone, but the world must understand that the land belongs to us.” The settlers in the documentary emphasized two important points: they shared a common Jewish identity as well as a dream for a stronger and complete Israel. With time, the interests of Israel’s far right have been best represented by the Gush Emunim settler movement. It has been characterized as a “ ‘charismatic, messianic, religious, political, revitalization movement’, which has become institutionalized” (Sprinzak, 1991;p.107). The Gush’s success has been attributed to solid leadership, an unwavering theology, and common “socio-cultural roots and experiences”. Its original members were penniless immigrants who settled the land based on their religious convictions. Initially, these members can be classified as being part of the “subaltern”, i.e. they were the marginalized members of Israel’s largely secular society. As a result, the government did not immediately endorse their land seizures. This perception, and...