How far were the NEW MoDEL ARMY responsoble for the trial and execution of Charles I
...& C Durston ‘ ‘The English Revolution – advanced history sourcebook pp103 source 6.2. 13. B Williams ‘Elusive Settlement’ pp89. 14. B Coward & C Durston ‘ ‘The English Revolution – advanced history sourcebook pp102 source 6.1. 15. B Williams ‘Elusive Settlement’ pp72. B Coward ‘The Stuart Age’ pp194. Durston/Coward argue that 16‘The Political Presbyterians… would have been content to see Charles return with very few conditions…. While the Political Independents were anxious to secure greater concessions from the King.’ This factional bickering, is one of the main reasons why a settlement was not reached. If the groups within one side are in disagreement, how can they be expected to make a deal with the opposition. After the Newcastle Propositions the New Model Army was becoming restless and increasingly aware of the weakness and divisions within parliament. Both the Political Presbyterians and the Political Independents were talking of disbanding the army. The New Model was owed a total of three million pounds in pay back wages and resented parliament as they were uncertain they would receive their money and certain securities they felt were outstanding. The Petition of the New Model Army in March 1647 declared; 17‘ we humbly desire… a full and sufficient provision may be made by Ordinance of Parliament…. For our indemnity and security in all such cases.’ The New Model, willing to negotiate with parliament would have settled for 16 weeks instead of the 18 to 43 weeks they were entitled to. However as Williams states 18‘these were figures Holles and his Presbyterian Party… did not wish to contemplate.’ Parliament was not willing to pay back the army what they were owed as it was in a 19‘precarious fiscal state.’ Coward states that 20‘these material grievances (of pay) were the dominant motive behind army mutinies.’ It is generally agreed by historians that it was 21‘but a few proud, self conceited, hot-headed secretaries’ who influenced the average tractable soldier who only resisted parliament because of as Coward puts it 22‘bread and butter issues.’ Anderson agrees 23‘the New Model was not made up of political and religious visionaries, but contained troops for whom military life was a profession rather than crusade.’ However it has been suggested that the idealistic and radical nature of the New Model army were the driving force behind mutinies of 1646- 47. Coward stresses that 24‘at some stage in 1647 radical ideological religious and political demands became inextricably bound up with the army’s professional grievances.’ Anderson agrees that 25‘the crisis arose from something more deep-seated than arrears and ingratitude.’ The exasperation and desperation of the New Model had in fact led them desperate measures. The 26‘provocative’ behaviour of parliament led to strong spirits of the average soldier were as Durston agrees 27‘manipulated by senior army officials.’ Baxter was horrified to find 28‘the plotting heads very hot upon that which intimated their intention to subvert both Church and State.’ The Leveller influence on the Army has been highly debated. There are those who argue that the New Model Army was driven to politicisation by the 29‘emergence of radical ideas and the influence of the Levellers’ as they saw ‘in the discontented soldiers potential allies for their cause.’ 16. B Coward & C Durston ‘ ‘The English Revolution – advanced history sourcebook pp102. 17. B Coward & C Durston ‘ ‘The English Revolution – advanced history sourcebook pp105 source 6.4. 18+19. B Williams ‘Elusive Settlement’ pp77. 20,21+22. B Coward ‘The Stuart Age’ pp195. 23. A Anderson ‘The Civil Wars 1640-9’ pp112. 24. B Coward ‘The Stuart Age’ pp195 25,26. A Anderson ‘The Civil Wars 1640-9’ pp112. 27. B Coward & C Durston ‘ ‘The English Revolution – advanced history sourcebook pp108. 28. Baxter Autobiography. 29. B Coward ‘The Stuart Age’ pp195. The Leveller Large Petition of 1647 stated 30‘Wee still find the Nation oppressed with grievances of the same destructive nature as formerly though under other notions.’ This suggests that ‘ the Nation’ had been rid of one grievance i.e. the King, but he had been replaced by Parliament who instigated more problems. It is true that radicals were few as Baxter implies but Williams is right in saying ‘they were not imaginary.’ Put together radical publications like that of Lilburn, Overton and Walwyn, the emergence of the Levellers, resistance of Parliament and king and it suggests that a new factor of extremism had emerged by 1646. There is no doubt that there was a strong religious influence over the New Model Army. Ireton argued that the soldiers had fought for a cause in which they believed and Williams suggests that the average soldier ‘might not have been elected to represent the people in that matter of settlement, but they did represent the people of God.’ This argument is highly influenced by the idea of the time that God’s Providence was the deciding factor of events. Meaning that ‘God had chosen and approved the Army as the instrument of his Will.’ Therefore the soldiers felt they had been given a sort of divine right to succeed and defeat the King. The military felt they had a special right to decide on a settlement. However Charles also felt he had a divine right and represented God’s wishes. In a speech delivered to parliament Charles stated ‘Kings are justly called gods for that they exercise a manner of resemblance of divine power upon earth’. In March 1647 the soldiers of the New model Army produced a pamphlet protesting at the imprisonment of ‘those honest people who have shown themselves with us’ and their unsettled pay. The discontent of the army seems not to have been an influence from the Levellers or indeed the ‘hot-headed’ officers of the army who ‘by their very heat actively bore down the rest…’ but from the fury of the private soldier. Coward stresses that ‘the harshness and unfairness with which the army were treated by parliament’ was the main thrust behind the dramatic politicisation. Holles referred to army petition as treasonable stating that those supporting it were ‘enemies of the state.’ Parliaments refusal to address the armies grievances and pay their due wages caused an explosion of distrust and contempt towards parliament. The rank and file described MP’s as ‘foxes who lurk in their dens’ ready to pounce on the backs of unsuspecting victims. This dramatic split in ‘parliament’s’ side resulted in an irreparable relationship between Parliament and the Army. The discarding and reduction of the New Model by Holles and his Presbyterian party caused the final breach between the two groups. The army could not conceive why Parliament would settle with the King over the Newcastle propositions. They felt civil war would then not have achieved anything but more control for MP’s inside Parliament. The second apology of all the private soldiers of April 1647 declared ‘Is it not better to die like men than to be enslaved and hanged like dogs?’ 30. B Coward ‘The Stuart Age’ pp196. 31. However it can be understood that Parliament merely wanted to settle with the King to bring peace and stability after civil war. Sharp suggests that ‘MP’s now aimed to come rapidly to an agreement with the King, disband the hideously expensive and increasingly threatening army, and establish a national Presbyterian Church which all people would have to attend.’ Holles and his party could merely be wishing to return the country to normality and the right way up. This source is a presentation of what people thought life would be like without a king. The conservative reaction which swept over the country after civil war was making a deep impression on everyone. Coward states that many were ‘anxious…for a return to political normality’ which might remedy the ‘decay of trade’. It can be understood why parliament were willing to settle with only small conditions with the King as Anderson stresses the ‘war weary nation’ was ‘increasingly resentful of heavy taxation’ needed fro the upkeep of the Army. She suggests that ‘it was natural that the remedy of disbanding the army should be considered.’110 On 25th May the Commons voted to disband the New Model infantry regiments with only 8 weeks arrears of wages paid. In reaction to this Cornet Joyce seized the king from his parliamentary guards at Holmby House and took him to Newmarket so that the King could not be used against the army in a settlement. With Parliaments side split into two it now seemed impossible to achieve a settlement. During July the army produced the Heads of proposals which was intended to be sent to the king as the armies offer of settlement. The fact that the army was willing to settle with the King at all was surprising and the as Coward states ‘it was the most generous settlement the King had yet been offered.’ The Army called for guarantees of political and religious rights but in a desperate bid for settlement the army council offered an Act of Oblivion that exempted only a few noted royalists. The army appears rational and accommodating towards the King and Cromwell was sensitive to the fact that if the army engaged in a speedy occupation of the capital it might seem as if the army was dictating a settlement. ‘Whatsoever you get by a treaty, whatsoever comes to be settled upon us in that way, it will be firm and durable, it will be conveyed over to posterity… that which you have by force, I look upon it as nothing.’ Again settlement was not achieved because Charles did not accept the terms of the Heads of proposals. Coward states that ‘Charles (as always) never intended to reach a settlement.’ Anderson agrees and suggests that Charles ‘while overtly demanding better terms, he was covertly hoping for something from the Scots.’ His opponents had assumed that there was a limit to Charles’ determination- that he would ultimately accept the logic of defeat. This was not the case. In Sir John Berkeley’s account of the kings negotiations with the army in July 1647 he comments that the King ‘entertained them (Heads proposals) with very tart and bitter discourses; saying sometimes that he would have no man to suffer for his sake…’ Charles was once again unreasonable and foolish to not accept any terms for settlement. Even though the army’s proposals were his best offer yet he still held out, waiting for a better offer. Another obstacle to a successful settlement was the rising influence of the Levellers. Coward state that ‘the army’s occupation of London allowed the Levellers for the first time to influence sections of opinion within the army on a significant scale.’ The agitators and Levellers drafted The Case of the Army Truly Stated and then the reformed this into the Agreement of the People. These documents expressed their wish for the freedom to worship as they wished, freedom from conscription and more basic rights for the people. The Levellers felt The Heads was too accommodating to the king. The failure of the King to accept The Heads caused bickering within the New Model but also leads the army as a whole to be more radical and politicised. An example of this is the Putney debate. It was an independent discussion chamber where those outside of parliament where allowed to express their views. This unprecedented event shows just how revolutionary the army was becoming. While The New Model were busy squabbling between themselves Charles escaped from his custody and fled to the Isle of White where he signed the engagement with the Scots which consisted of a Presbyterian government for three years and all armies were to be disbanded. This was the ultimate betrayal by Charles. It was a turning point in British history; as Williams says ‘the King was no longer a corner stone of the constitution, republicanism became a serious political situation.’ No longer where Cromwell Ireton and Fairfax willing not negotiate with the King, Charles had pushed the balance of power off the scales. In 1648 parliament declared a Vote of no Addresses ‘the Lords and commons do declare that they will make no further addresses or applications to the King.’ However there was still a majority of England in favour of a settlement, and as Coward states a ‘return to pre-war order in society and government.’ It can be said that Charles accurately recognised the lack of support for political upheaval as he arrogantly stated ‘ You cannot do without me: you will fall to ruin if I do not sustain you.’ Williams notes that with civil war imminent St John’s middle group were ‘terrified at the prospect…and switched sides and joined Holles’ Party.’ P84. If Charles had imply been dealing with the Presbyterian Party he probably would have been returned to his throne but what he failed to realise was that ‘he was now dealing with a different brand of opposition – in the end the army leaders were prepared to override parliament and the law in order to solve the problem of Charles I.’ 131 Charles had broken all trust between himself and the army as Cromwell ...