EXPOUND AND ASSESS MILL’S ARGUMENTS FOR THE LIBERTY/HARM PRINCIPLE
... interest that is consequently harmed, however far removed. And so an infinite regress… In order to accept this – we would, no doubt, require some definitive account of the nature of interests so that we might decide at what point affectation becomes an affectation of interest and vice versa. This, however, is content for another discussion and I shall return now Mill’s original text. In his introductory chapter, Mill discusses the developmental history of the state, accounting the movement from tyranny right through to democracy. Yet this move from government as an independent power to government as a peoples’ power – is still not found to be wholly satisfactory. There are certain flaws implicit within the democratic structure, namely, ‘the tyranny of the majority’ that is just as readily abused as any other form of absolutist power. Indeed, Mill seems to fear this threat of collective opinion and its pressures to conform just as much, if not more, than political despotism… ‘There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion…and to find that limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs, as protection against political despotism.’ For this reason Mill seeks to limit majority power. To suppress liberty and attempt to exercise control ‘produces other evils, greater than those it would prevent’ - a course too oft adhered to through the pressures of collective opinion. And yet within this regard for personal Liberty Mill is not altogether consistent. Indeed, those members of society deemed incapable of making informed decisions (i.e. Children or the mentally incapacitated) are to be ‘protected against their own actions as well as against external injury.’ A just exclusion we may agree, but Mill proceeds to condemn others to a fate of paternalistic rule… ‘Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end.’ What nature, primarily, are we to accept as barbaric? What constitutes the inferiority of one being to another? Is it someone lacking in refinement or culture, or merely someone from another land? Surely such dispositions relate to personal preference – and cannot, therefore, be considered an objective measure of inferiority. So how is it, then, that we are to demand obedience from one individual whilst offering liberty to another? In this case, Mill justifies paternalistic rule in the eventually of effecting some improved end – but could this not also hold true within society as a whole and not uniquely to those few individuals of a supposed barbaric nature? In chapter 3 Mill cites diversity as a fundamental necessity of society. He recognizes individuality as the ‘principle ingredient of human happiness’ and an essential source of human progress, individually and collectively. Individuality, therefore, is crucial to happiness. According to Mill, each individual should be able to pursue his own good in his own way. Liberty allows the means to flourish, whereas conformity leads to stagnation and misery. Perhaps, in this sense, Mill is over optimistic. Will any given individual necessarily pursue that which is best for him? Indeed, will he even know how this preferred course of action actually manifests itself? In contrast to Mill, Aristotle supposed paternalistic laws to be a necessary guide to individuals – eudemonia only achievable by those who have formed a virtuous character under the guide of the state. There are certainly laws that reflect this notion within society today. They offer insurance against weakness of will and pose restrictions in a positive way - such as the wearing of seatbelts in cars for example, or social security. If, as I have suggested, an individual may not be aware of what action will be most beneficial or, indeed, detrimental to himself, a furthe...