Does the Good Friday Agreement provide the basis for a solution to the Northern Ireland problem, or does its fate show that there is no solution to the Northern Ireland problem?
...veto, therefore, is incorporated into the Assembly to protect the rights of minorities. (O’Leary in Whyte Lecture, 1998, 4) The number of ministerial posts a party gets correlates to its strength in the Assembly and is subject to regulations that ensure proportionality and equality runs through all governmental and public sectors. (O’Leary in Whyte Lecture, 1998, 4) Although for unionists having to share power with Sinn Féin may seem an abomination after what happened in the last thirty years, the Assembly can bring both communities together in working on issues that affect both communities regardless of their differences. Strands two and three of the GFA set up a North/South Ministerial Council and a British Irish Council reflecting the aspirations of nationalists to have closer links with the rest of Ireland and unionists to maintain their identity with the rest of Britain. The agreement made it clear that the Assembly could not function without the establishment of the North/South Ministerial Council, so unionists could not block its development without disestablishing Stormont. (O’Leary in Wilford, 2001, 63) The British/Irish Council was meant to forge closer links between the North and the rest of Great Britain excluding England itself, but it was given less importance than the North/South bodies as it was only stipulated as a voluntary option whether to set up ministerial bodies for it. (O’Leary in Wilford, 2001, 65) Nevertheless both councils represented a chance for nationalists and unionists for fulfilment with the people to whom they nationally identified with. The GFA also had to deal with some difficult issues that were seen as fundamental to the conflict resolution. It was presented in such a way, however, that no paramilitaries had to engage in a formal surrender to the other side that they had opposed in war. (O’Leary in Scottish Affairs, 1999, 29) The decommissioning of paramilitary weapons was meant to have been the responsibility of the Independent International Committee on Decommissioning, which was to be balanced out by a commitment from the British army to demilitarise. In addition political prisoners would have to be released, which was an emotive issue for everyone caught up in the conflict, and policing reform would have to take place in order to be more representative of the nationalist community. (O’Leary in Whyte Lecture, 1998, 14) Addressing these issues formed a vital part in making the GFA a basis for a solution. The human rights and equality agenda also enhanced the prospects of the GFA achieving success. It outlined the steps to be taken to ensure the creation of a non-discriminatory and representative civil service and judiciary. Cultural equality was also enshrined under the terms of the GFA guaranteeing that all traditions in the North would be free to express their identity without fear of sectarian harassment. (O’Leary in Wilford, 2001, 60) The European Convention on Human Rights was adopted with a Bill of Rights particular to Northern Ireland to back it up. This was all seen as an attempt to make the North equally bi-national. (O’Leary in Wilford, 2001, 61) The people of Ireland overwhelmingly endorsed the GFA with a 95% ‘yes’ vote in the South and a 71% ‘yes’ vote in the North. It was considered the large majority of nationalist votes that helped push the GFA through in the Northern referendum as figures show that only a very small majority of unionists voted for it. (Hayes and McAllister in Irish Political Studies, 79) The reason for the split in the unionist community lay in the differing interpretations as to what it would eventually lead to. For nationalists the GFA offered the opportunity to play an equal role with their unionist neighbours in determining a just future through working in the power-sharing executive. Measures were there to promote equality and parity of esteem that had been absent the last time Stormont had accommodated a government. The long-term aim for nationalists was to work the North/South bodies to gently persuade unionists that the best benefits for everyone would come in a unified country. (Doyle in Scottish Affairs, 1998, 19) For unionists the GFA allowed them to feel the benefits of the ceasefires by sitting in a Stormont government once again. The acceptance of the principle of consent by nationalists and republicans, especially in the changing of Articles Two and Three was a major plus for unionists. (Doyle in Scottish Affairs, 1998, 19) The recognition of Northern Ireland’s constitutional status within the UK would hitherto have been unthinkable for the republican movement particularly. (Doyle in Scottish Affairs, 1998, 9) Pro-Agreement unionists felt then that the GFA presented them with a real chance in persuading nationalists that the reconstructed Union with Britain offered them a secure and prosperous future. (O’Leary in Whyte Lecture, 1998, 15) The two contrasting arguments for the GFA led to a substantial minority of unionists to reject the deal as only being a basis for a united Ireland and hence not a solution to the ‘Northern Ireland problem’. They have rejected David Trimble’s assertion that the GFA actually strengthens the Union in spite of the ideological concessions they have won from nationalists and republicans. (Cochrane, 2001, 396) Rather they see it as an appeasement of terrorists with prisoner releases, demilitarisation and policing reform at the heart of their argument. The unwillingness of the IRA to declare the war as being over and to make a start on decommissioning has fuelled their perception of the GFA as fundamentally flawed. (Bew in Cox, Guelke, Stephen, 2000, 295) The fate of the GFA lies, therefore, in the ability of the pro-Agreement parties to persuade the majority of their respective communities to make the Agreement work. So far it has been a rocky road with the word ‘crisis’ being synonymous with describing the attempts to implement it. The first sign that the GFA might falter came with the insistence from Trimble that the IRA decommission their weapons before Sinn Féin could form part of the executive. Although within the terms of the GFA Trimble had no grounds to make such a demand, he was facilitated in this approach by the British and Irish governments along with the SDLP, who all were keen to see him gain control of the majority of the unionist community due to the split in his party that had created a very difficult situation for him. (O’Leary in Wilford, 2001, 54-55) The dilemma for the other pro-Agreement parties was whether to insist on pursuing a legalistic approach to the GFA, whereby everything was implemented by the letter, or bow to Trimble’s demand in order that he would bring a majority of unionism along with him in making the GFA work as a basis for ...