Democracy
...n nations, has truly meant liberal democracy. A liberal democracy has two clear characteristics: a government based upon the fair election of its leaders (democracy) and “a political system marked…by the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property (liberty)” (Zakaria 1997, 22). In governments that do not completely embrace the notion of civil liberty, a potential for civil unrest and possible war exists. If the government does not uphold basic human rights, it matters very little if the leaders are or are not elected into office. The end results are the same. Many times oppressed people will eventually rise against the leadership in hopes of gaining freedom. Even within the US, one can find examples of oppressed people rising to gain more freedom. One such example is that of the woman’s battle for suffrage at the turn of the century. With this understanding, one can find validity in Zakaria’s statement about liberal peace. Within nations that practice liberalism there lies a foundation of freedoms that allows each of its citizens to feel safe and cared for by his nation. These freedoms also symbolize the common goals that unite liberal governments, allowing them to work with one another without having to resort to physical means of manipulation and coercion. As I pointed out before, Dahl, Huntington and Sorensen share a common philosophy or belief of what “democracy” means. However, a closer look of the individuals may give more insight into how their beliefs parallel or digress from Zakaria’s. Dahl clearly states that “democracy,” in his mind, describes an idealized world where democracy (elections) and liberalism coexists in one nation, an epitome of what a liberal democracy should be. Thus, in relation to the imperfect, real world, he describes different liberal democratic governments as polyarchys. In his book, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, Dahl clearly outlines those factors that are important to polyarchy. First, he states that there are “classic liberal freedoms” which are crucial to public participation in government (Dahl 1971, 20). Such freedoms include the right to oppose the government and form groups, the freedom of free speech and fair vote, etc. (Dahl 1971, 20). This clearly indicates a practice of liberalism. The second and third factors focus on increases in political competition and public participation. The last important factor he gives is the idea that with the increase of liberalism, more opportunities form, thus leading to an increase in the variety and number of interests that would be represented in policy making. One can clearly see that Dahl’s view of “democracy” is one that combines democracy (elections) with liberalism. When trying to apply Dahl’s idea of democracy to Zakaria’s statement of peace, there arises a question of possible separation of democracy from liberalism, a key to Zakaria’s statement. However, Dahl does introduce the idea of a political democracy, separate from democracy in terms of elections, which is “sometimes referred to as a liberal democracy because of its focus on the form of government” (Sorensen 1993, 12). Making this distinction between democracy and political democracy seemingly separates the different ideals of liberty and democracy. The next scientist, Huntington, followed Dahl in that he, too, “created” an ideal democracy. Instead of calling his idealized democratic nation a democracy, he calls it a “true” democracy. He states that democracy, when in reference to elections, is a very minimal definition and that “Elections, open, free, and fair, are the essence of democracy, the inescapable sine qua non” (1991, 9). By including the word “free” one can assume that Huntington is implying that a certain amount of political liberties, such as the freedom to free speech and form groups, are essential to democracy. With such a statement, it becomes more evident that Huntington does not really separate democracy (elections) from liberty. He then continues to present his opinion by making several points while defining democracy. His fourth point was in reference to treating democracy and nondemocracy as a dichotomous or continuous variable. He chose to treat them as a dichotomous variable and this may be where the weakness in his argument lies. By choosing them to be dichotomous variables, he looses many of the subtleties that are so important in separating different governments. By trying to divide governments into two distinct categories, his definition may loose value as it is applied to a situation that does not seem to fit his criterion. Though it may seem as if Huntington opposes Zakaria’s statement, one must look at Huntington’s weakness and judge if that weakness allows for Zakaria’s statement to still stand as true. Before discussing a problem posed in Zakaria’s argument, I finally turn to Sorensen. In Sorensen’s view, Schumpeter’s definition of democracy is very narrow in scope. Sorensen labels this type of government as a political system. On the other hand, he states that liberal democracy, or democratic autonomy, encompasses a wider view of democracy. This type of government, in Sorensen’s opinion, could be correctly labeled as a social, economic and political system, thus integrating liberalism with democracy. Like Dahl, Sorensen views the ideal democracy as one that practices both democracy (elections) and liberalism and labels democracy in the real world as political democracy. He gives in his book, Democracy and Democratization, three main requirements or elements that are needed to have a political democracy: “competition, participation and civil and political liberties” (1993, 12). Once again, we see a combination of liberalism and democracy (election). Also in his book, Sorensen presents two routes to democracy (or political democracy): 1. An increase in competition or liberalization (the “extent to which rights and liberties are available to at least some members of the political system”) and 2. An increase in participation or inclusiveness (“the proportion of citizens who enjoy political rights and liberties”) (1993, 12-13). This idea clearly differentiates between democracy and liberalism, supporting Zakaria’s argument of separation of terms. It is clear that each of these three authors present similar but varying definitions of democracy. In one aspect, one can say that they argue against Zakaria’s point of democratic versus liberal peace. Using their “real” world or “ideal” world definitions, it is evident that they support the idea that it is democratic peace of which Kant was speaking. All three, especially Huntington, clearly state how they felt that liberty was almost a virtue of democr...