Alfred Thayer Mahan
...is, chiefly on the grounds of oversimplification by omission.” (Paret, 452) Essentially, in order to assert his point about the necessity of a strong navy, Mahan obsequiously awards many victories to the arrival of naval forces, and thus overlooks the action taken by the navy’s land counterparts. Critics easily counter Mahan’s arguments simple examples of Bonaparte’s sea victories over England at a time “when Britain’s mastery of the sea was uncontested.” (Paret, 454) Mahan goes on to explain, in his presidential address to the American Historical Association, that history should be an “artistic grouping of subordinate details around a central idea” (Paret, 454) and must be “kept subordinate to the ‘central feature.’ ” (Paret, 454) This manipulation of history is not valid, and, much like the Mormon societal doctrine must be continually updated to agree with later augmentations. Therefore, criticisms of his writings and speeches must be partially valid due to Mahan’s largely distorted view of decisive victories, whether or not naval predominance asserted the win. Naval strategy of the nineteenth-century was still based around broadsiding the enemy ships. Therefore, attacks consisted of pointed strikes that would separate the enemy fleet by “concentrating against one unit while holding the others in check.” (Paret, 458) This would divide the fleet, incapacitating them and breaking the navy dictum: “‘ Never divide the fleet!’” (Paret, 459) Although dividing the fleet could defeat an enemy, the most crushing blow could come by attacking their commerce. “ ‘The harassment and distress caused to a country by serious interference with its commerce will be conceded by all.’ But, he added, ‘as a primary and fundamental measure, sufficient in itself to crush an enemy, it is probably a delusion and a most dangerous delusion.’ ” (Paret, 459) Mahan realized that although blockading merchant ships could cripple an enemy, it “was not the way to dry up his resources and effect his economic strangulation.” (Paret, 459) So, inevitably, Mahan would have to hunt down and destroy all of the enemy’s warships. (Paret, 459) Mahan in his own time was obviously a more than competent naval strategist, but his skewed views of historic battles show that his emphasis on the navy would have destroyed his own nation had he been the supreme commander. By putting too much emphasis on sea warfare, he has ne...