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In setting the stage for Truth and Method, Gadamer expresses the view that
the human sciences are connected to modes of experience that lie outside science: with the experiences of philosophy, of art, and of history itself. ... (Gadamer, 1960, p. xxii)
Gadamer is aware that we approach such statements with certain preconceptions. In this case we know that some of the "human sciences," philosophy for example, can be rigorously methodological; and even art critics and "serious historical research[ers]" profess to have a "methodological self consciousness" (Gadamer, 1976, p. ... So, if, as Gadamer claims, "the human sciences are connected to modes of experience . ... For instance, he claims that "this [project] does not in the slightest prevent the methods of modern science from being applicable to the social world," and "I d[o] not remotely intend to deny the necessity of methodological work in the human sciences" (Gadamer, 1960, p. ... This leaves us wondering what Gadamer takes "method" to be, and what is the precise role which he thinks it ought to play in the human sciences? ... Gadamer criticizes both of these thinkers for being too methodological. ... It is in this context that I shall offer the following interpretation of Gadamers position: Gadamers central thesis is that there is no such thing as a reliable method for the human sciences; or, put somewhat differently, Gadamer thinks that social scientists who pretend to be carrying out a reliable method are deluding themselves. ... According to Gadamer, I argue, knowledge of things social is acquired through an application of the "hermeneutic circle". ... If my interpretation of Gadamer is correct, then he thinks that the hermeneutic circle is not a method, properly speaking, and that it is the only way to obtain truth in the human sciences. ... Put differently, I shall argue that Gadamer has some difficulty in explaining how the hermeneutic circle can be misapplied.
Part 1: Gadamers Criticism of Schleiermachers and Diltheys Appeals to Method
"If we consider Schleiermachers Hermeneutics," Gadamer claims, "we find his view of this discipline peculiarly restricted by his modern view of science" (Gadamer, 1976, p. ... Here Gadamer uses "his modern view of science" in a somewhat derogatory sense, suggesting that Schleiermachers project is overly methodological. Thus, by investigating the "restrictive" role which Gadamer takes method to play in Schleiermachers hermeneutics we might better understand Gadamers position on method in general. Schleiermacher describes hermeneutics as "the art of avoiding misunderstanding" (Gadamer, 1960, p. ... As this characterization of hermeneutics suggests, his theory is underpinned by the assumption that misunderstanding follows more naturally than accurate comprehension when we read a text. This points to one of Schleiermachers motivations for taking a methodological approach to hermeneutics; he hoped that by being methodological an interpreter will be able to avoid misunderstanding a text. ... Hence, accurate understanding, for Schleiermacher, consists in "understand[ing] a writer better than he understood himself" (Gadamer, 1960, p. ... "This is shown," Gadamer notes, "by the fact that [Schleiermacher] assumes something like complete understanding when divinatory transposition takes place" (Gadamer, 1960, p. ... The fact that Schleiermacher takes interpretation to involve understanding an author better than she understood herself (through understanding her sub-conscious intentions as well as her conscious ones) is important to Gadamer. ... Even when the author interprets his own text, "he has no automatic authority over the person who is simply receiving his work" (Gadamer, 1960, p. ... This indicates, to Gadamer, that "the only standard of interpretation is the sense of his creation, what it means" (Gadamer, 1960, p. ... Therefore, Gadamer concludes that, contra Schleiermacher, the meaning of a text does not lie in the intentions of its author after all. Since both parties make a contribution to the meaning of a text, this "collapses the distinction between interpreter and author" (Gadamer, 1960, p. ... ) In constructing this argument Gadamer makes a subtle appeal to a theory of meaning which he develops more thoroughly in his analysis of art. ... The details of this view will hopefully become more explicit in the next section, where we deal with the problem of how Gadamer can account for the notion of an incorrect interpretation. ... However, little has been said about the actual process, the method itself, which Gadamer takes Schleiermacher to be endorsing. We have yet to come across an example of what Gadamer means by "method. ... The first candidate is not so much a method, Gadamer explains, "as a philologists rule of thumb that people passed on and Schleiermacher took up" (Gadamer, 1960, p. ... However, this assumption becomes methodological, for Gadamer, when all texts are regarded this way, irrespective of their particular content. ... no longer pertains to the subject matter under discussion, rather he views the statement that a text makes as a free production, and disregards its content as knowledge" (Gadamer, 1960, p. ... Gadamer considers the placing of all texts on a level playing field to be a disregard for their particular content. ... Gadamer emphasizes the extent to which Schleiermacher invokes the hermeneutic circle; he points out that "Schleiermacher follows Friedrich Ast, and the whole hermeneutical and rhetorical tradition when he regards it as a fundamental principle of understanding that the meaning of the part can be discovered only from the context- i. ... ultimately from the whole" (Gadamer, 1960, p. ... As Gadamer points out, in the construction of an interpretation "an individuality is always being expressed" (Gadamer, 1960, p. ... Gadamer notes that Schleiermacher appeals to the view that "everyone carries a tiny bit of everyone else within him, so that divination is stimulated by comparison with oneself" (Gadamer, 1960, p. ... Investigating Gadamers critique of Dilthey should also aid us in our larger task of attempting to understand what Gadamer means by "method. ... Gadamer explains that, according to Dilthey, "it is life itself that unfolds and forms itself in intelligible unities, and it is in terms of the single individual that these are understood" (Gadamer, 1960, p. ... " Gadamer notes that the "method" being employed here is the hermeneutic circle. He claims that, in Dilthey, the "method of romantic hermeneutics is being expanded into universality. Like the coherence of a text, the structural coherence of life is defined as a relation between the whole and the parts" (Gadamer, 1960, p. ... Dilthey takes it as a methodological necessity that we "adapt the [Cartesian] standpoint of reflection and doubt, and that this is what happens in all forms of scientific reflection" (Gadamer, 1960, p. ... As Gadamer points out, "in Diltheys attempt to ground the human sciences he does not distinguish his methodological doubt and doubts that come on their own accord" (Gadamer, 1960, p. ... This statement touches upon a problem which was also present in Schleiermachers notion of hermeneutics as an attempt to overcome misunderstanding. Both theorists are mislead by their view that the threat of misunderstanding is the main objective which hermeneutics must overcome. ...
We are finally in a position to understand in what Gadamer takes method to consist. We noticed that, in his critique of Schleiermacher, Gadamer mentions three expectations behind his appeal to method: to avoid misunderstandings, to enable us to determine which interpretation of a text is the most accurate, and to eventually provide a complete interpretation of a text. ... We noticed that Gadamer makes a point of articulating both Schleiermacher and Diltheys adherence to the hermeneutic circle. ... Gadamer adds that , "The point of Heideggers hermeneutical reflection is not so much to prove that there is a circle as to show that this circle has ontologically positive significance" (Gadamer, 1960, p. ... Until now the circle has been viewed as an obstacle to be overcome, and it is up to Gadamer to show us how it acquires positive significance. ... This theory poses an interesting problem for Gadamer, for it seems that there is no limit to the variety of interpretations which could be provided for any particular text. ... Since Gadamer deprives us of a principled method for adjudicating between these interpretations, then there is nothing stopping a text from obtaining any meaning whatsoever. ...
Gadamer might want to take the same approach in answering this question as we suggested for Dilthey, to reformulate it by asking how various interpretations of a text come about in the fist place? ... This is a position which Gadamer emphatically rejects. ... The middle ground which Gadamer will attempt to explore is the notion of prejudice and its relation to tradition. ... For example, Gadamer describes the acquisition of a concept in perceptual terms, a new concept enables one "to recognize, that is, to pick something out of the stream of images floating past as being identical" (Gadamer, 1976, p. ... Thus, for Gadamer, the possession of a language is not only a necessary condition for our being able to experience the world, but the particular language that we adopt will affect the way that we experience it. ... This explains why Gadamer describes the acquisition of a language as adopting a "tradition;" with a set of concepts we inherit a way of perceiving the world which has developed over time. ... Imparted with such insight, we become what Gadamer calls a "historically effected consciousness." Gadamer departs from Hegel with the claim that we can never attain a state of complete self knowledge. ... Even Warnke seems cognizant of this issue, for she elsewhere claims that the charge of relativism can be brought against Gadamer despite his claim that we are historically effected.
At this point one might choose to raise an objection against Gadamer which we previously raised, on his behalf, against Schleiermacher. ... In this respect Gadamer appears even worse off. ... *4
We find Gadamer tackling with this issue in his characterization of understanding as a "fusion of horizons." Gadamer uses the term "horizon" to describe the perspective of the world which one inherits with a tradition. He emphasizes the perceptual element of this metaphor in claiming that "the horizon is the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point" (Gadamer, 1960, p. ... Elsewhere Gadamer mentions that horizons are essentially linguistic in nature, thereby emphasizing the link between language and perception. A further aspect which follows from the linguistic nature of horizons is "that there is absolutely no captivity within a language" (Gadamer, 1976. ... Here Gadamer is apparently referring to the open-textured nature of language which enables us to characterize new situations. Gadamer wants to incorporate this notion of a horizon into the view that "all understanding is a fusion of horizons" (Gadamer, 1960, p. ... This impression is supported by Gadamers claim that "it seems to be a legitimate hermeneutical requirement [that] we must place ourselves in the other situation in order to understand it" (Gadamer, 1960, p.
Approximate Word count = 8744
Approximate Pages = 35
(250 words per page double spaced)
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