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“Has Nozick defeated the sceptic?”
Since Descartes’ failed attempt at formulating a valuable theory of knowledge, the main aim of epistemology has been that of being able, finally, to define knowledge, and defeat scepticism once and for all. If we consider sceptical arguments thoroughly, the sceptic, in denying the possibility of knowledge, presupposes there is some and therefore refutes himself. ... The Gettier counter example where Henry comes to know that “McEnroe is this years Wimbledon champion” is one in which Henry has a justified false belief by inference, from which he justifiably believes something to be true, and thus arrives at a justified true belief which is not however knowledge. ... However, Robert Nozick’s conditional theory of knowledge seems to be able to put an end to this circle and redefine knowledge and finally prove that such things as “I know that I am sitting writing”are true. What Nozick identifies in the Gettier example, is that the justification Henry had for believing that “McEnroe is this year’s Wimbledon champion” was too luckily true to count as knowledge. ... Nozick insists that for knowledge that p, a (Henry)has to believe that p, and if p were not true, a would no longer believe that p. ...
Another example which Nozick’s fourth condition can amend is where a man claims to know that there is a police car outside his house, which there is, so his is a true belief, however his justification for that belief is given by the fact that he can hear a siren. ... Now, for a belief to be knowledge, it must be sensitive to the truth of the proposition believed; according to Nozick it must “track” the truth, in the sense that if the proposition were in changed circumstances still true (i. ... What is helpful in our quest for a sufficient definition of knowledge, is how Nozick’s conditional theory of knowledge gives a valuable account of what it is for a belief to be merely luckily true. ...
With this more sufficient definition of knowledge, Nozick intends to refute all sceptics who argue that any account of knowledge is incoherent, by breaching the principle of closure and thus rendering possible to prove we can know that we are not a brain in a jar.
Approximate Word count = 1756
Approximate Pages = 7
(250 words per page double spaced)
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